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Abstract 
This paper analyses the impact of fiscal decentralisation on the Australian economy at both 
the aggregate and state levels. Attention is given not only to economic growth but also to a 
number of important macroeconomic variables which may influence growth. The results 
suggest that there is no straightforward impact of fiscal decentralisation on the Australian 
economy. At the aggregate level, when measured through expenditure shares, decentralisation 
is found to decrease medium-term economic growth, worsen the budget balance and increase 
the size of the public sector. No statistically significant effects of decentralisation are found on 
price stability, physical capital investment or short-term economic growth. Alternatively, 
revenue decentralisation is found to increase medium-term economic growth, improve the 
budget balance and have a stabilising effect on prices, but no relationship is found with the 
size of the public sector. At the state level, decentralisation is generally found to have no 
significant impact on the distribution of income but a weak negative effect on economic 
growth. In obtaining these results, special consideration is given to variable measurement, 
model specification, estimation technique and sample coverage. The findings highlight the 
importance of understanding more than just the effect of decentralisation on any one facet of 
an economy.  
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1. Introduction 
Fiscal decentralisation continues to be a controversial aspect of modern political debate and 
a pertinent issue amongst economic policy-makers. Relationships between Australia’s Federal 
and State governments have been hampered by constant bickering and a general lack of 
cooperation over critical issues, such as health, education and infrastructure. The States 
complain of a lack of money and the Federal government accuses the States of being 
inefficient. Such controversies have created a need to understand the influence of government 
structure, particularly the level of fiscal decentralisation, on the performance of the Australian 
economy. Indeed, some suggest that a whole range of public policy issues end up depending 
on Federal-State relations (Garnaut, 2006: 85-6).  
While much of the literature on the topic of fiscal decentralisation has focused on its 
impact on growth
1, there is no consensus about the effect of fiscal decentralisation on 
economic growth. Oates (1995), in a study of forty countries for the period 1974 to 1989, 
found a positive relationship, a result confirmed by Yilmaz (1999) for 17 unitary and 13 
federal countries during 1971 to 1990 and by Iimi (2005) for 51 Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) transitional and developing countries between 1997 
and 2001. Conversely, Davoodi and Zou (1998), using panel data for 46 developed and 
developing countries, found no relationship for developed countries but a negative 
relationship for developing countries, the latter result being confirmed by Woller and Phillips 
(1998) in a study of 23 developing countries. In a study of 52 developed and developing 
countries from 1972 to 1997, however, Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2003) concluded that 
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fiscal decentralisation does not have a direct relationship with economic growth. 
Alternatively, Thiessen (2003), in a study of high-income OECD countries, found that the 
relationship between fiscal decentralisation and economic growth is positive when 
decentralisation is increasing from low levels, but then reaches a peak and turns negative. This 
suggests that a medium degree of decentralisation may be optimal, which is consistent with 
the findings of Eller (2004), Bodman and Ford (2006) and Campbell (2008). 
Owing to the difficulties that arise when performing cross-country analyses, particularly 
the influence of cultural, institutional, geographical, and economic differences, single country 
studies have also been conducted. In an analysis of the US during the period 1948 to 1994, Xie 
et al. (1999) found that further fiscal decentralisation would be detrimental to growth. 
Conversely, Akai and Sakata (2002) disaggregated the US into its 50 States and concluded that 
fiscal decentralisation contributes to economic growth, and on the basis of an analysis of US 
metropolitan areas, Stansel (2005) reached the same conclusion. In an analysis of economic 
growth in Spain, Carrion-i-Silvestre et al. (2008) found that decentralisation has a negative 
effect at the aggregated, economy-wide level but a positive relationship for communities with 
a high degree of fiscal autonomy. Such a range of results highlights the lack of consensus in 
the literature on the relationship between fiscal decentralisation and economic growth. 
The economic effects of changes in Australia’s fiscal structure have yet to be thoroughly 
investigated, although some informal studies have been undertaken. For example, Twomey 
and Withers (2007), using cross-country regressions, estimated that Australians gained 
AU$4,507 per capita in 2006 from being a federal state. On the other hand, a report by Access 
Economics (2006) estimated that in 2004-05 the cost of Australia’s inefficient federalism 4 
 
system was approximately AU$9 billion. 
Some authors have suggested that the lack of consistent evidence about the relationship 
between economic growth and fiscal decentralisation indicates that importance of 
investigating not only whether fiscal decentralisation has a direct impact on growth, but also 
how it might indirectly influence economic growth (Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, 2003; 
Thiessen, 2003) through its impact on key macroeconomic variables.  
Building on this literature, the purpose of the present paper is to provide an analysis of the 
impact of fiscal decentralisation on the Australian economy at both the aggregate (i.e. 
national) and State (i.e. subnational) levels. While numerous studies have included Australia in 
cross-country analyses, no previous study has been conducted on the specific effect of 
decentralisation on Australia’s economic growth. Moreover, this study is the first to consider 
explicitly the impact of fiscal decentralisation on five key Australian macroeconomic variables 
– inflation and macrostability, public sector size, budget balance, physical capital investment 
and income distribution – together in one single study.
2  
The analysis proceeds in two stages. First, it focuses on the implications of fiscal 
decentralisation for Australian economic growth and other macroeconomic variables using 
time-series analysis. Although Australian States are considered quite similar in fundamental 
characteristics, there are a number of important differences that may potentially bias any 
conclusions based upon a purely aggregated study into Australia’s fiscal structure. Thus, 
secondly, the potential for state heterogeneity is accommodated by investigating the impact of 
                                                  
2 One should note that Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2003) examined the indirect effect of fiscal 
decentralisation on economic growth through inflation and Thiessen (2003) investigated the effect of investment. 
However, these were cross-country studies. 5 
 
decentralisation on State-level economic growth and income distribution, utilising both cross-
sectional and panel data for the six States and two major self-governing territories of the 
Commonwealth of Australia.  
Many studies in the fiscal decentralisation literature include only the two basic measures of 
revenue and expenditure decentralisation.
3 However Stegarescu (2005) and OECD (2005) have 
proposed additional measures to account for the decentralisation of decision making, and 
these measures were constructed for Australia for use in the present study, giving in all a total 
of sixteen alternative measures of fiscal decentralisation.  To take account of the uncertainty 
surrounding the choice of the appropriate statistical model the robustness of the results, 
derived from classical regression methods, is tested by utilising Bayesian Model Averaging 
(BMA). BMA has recently been applied in the growth regression literature to account for the 
model uncertainty inherent in models of economic growth (Fernandez et al., 2001a; Leon-
Gonzalez and Montolio, 2004; Eicher et al., 2007; Masanjala and Papageorgiou, 2008). 
However, such a technique has not previously been applied to determine the influence of 
fiscal decentralisation on economic growth.  
The results of the study suggest that fiscal decentralisation has no overall positive or 
negative effect on the Australian economy. Different aspects of fiscal decentralisation have 
different effects on Australia’s key macroeconomic variables
4, which in turn affect economic 
growth. Moreover, different measures of fiscal decentralisation produce conflicting results. An 
increase in expenditure decentralisation, for example, decreases medium-term economic 
growth, worsens the budget balance, and increases the size of the public sector. Revenue 
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decentralisation, on the other hand, increases medium-term economic growth, improves the 
budget balance and has a stabilising effect on prices, but has no relationship with the size of 
the public sector. Such results call attention to the importance of including more than one 
measure of decentralisation. Collectively, the results highlight the importance of 
understanding the effect of fiscal decentralisation on the range of factors affecting economic 
growth. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the influence of fiscal decentralisation 
on economic growth and the other important macroeconomic conditions. Section 3 outlines 
the empirical framework and structure of the data set utilised in the study. Section 4 presents 
the empirical findings and Section 5 reports the conclusions and suggests implications for 
policy. 
 
2. Fiscal decentralisation and macroeconomic conditions 
Following previous theoretical and empirical studies, the study examines the relationship 
between fiscal decentralisation and the following variable: economic growth, macroeconomic 
stability, public sector size, budget balance, physical capital investment, and income 
distribution.     
2.1 Economic growth 
There is also much debate in the theoretical literature over the extent to which fiscal 
decentralisation contributes to resolving Musgrave’s (1959) primary economic issues of public 
finance: distribution, allocation and stabilization. The advantages of fiscal decentralisation are 
thought to centre on three related concepts: efficient provision of output, effective decision 7 
 
making, and advanced innovation. First, it is argued that the devolution of spending powers 
to local governments significantly increases efficiency in the supply of public goods when the 
output of a particular service is of ‘local’ interest (Oates, 1972; 1991). Second, placing 
budgetary power with sub-national governments allows for more effective decision making 
since there is more information available, fewer people involved, a greater chance of 
homogeneity of interests, and the decision making powers are locally held (Bahl, 1999; 
Groenewegen, 1990). Third, decentralisation provides for greater innovation and 
experimentation in the provision of public goods (Groenewegen, 1990). 
On the other hand, it is argued that fiscal decentralisation leads to macro-instability, 
unequal income redistribution and does not account for social costs. As sub-national 
governments are constrained by their inability to manipulate cyclical aggregate economic 
movements, many argue that counter-cyclical policies are best implemented on the national 
level (Prud’homme, 1995; Tanzi, 1995; Ter-Minassian, 1997). The central government in a 
highly decentralised economy does not possess the budgetary power to control aggregate 
demand.
5 In addition, if a local community were to adopt a redistributive policy, the wealthy 
members would have a significant incentive to leave, thus ensuring that the policy would 
ultimately fail (Bahl, 1999; Oates, 1972). Finally, in making production decisions individual 
communities do not consider the externalities imposed on other communities, thus ignoring 
full social value (Oates, 1972).  
2.2 Macroeconomic Stability and Inflation 
The argument that macroeconomic policy should be administered solely by the central 
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government dates back to the important works of Musgrave (1959) and Oates (1972) who 
contended that any subnational policy stimulus would encounter a serious externality 
problem because subnational economies were predominantly ‘open’ with the vast majority of 
goods produced and consumed being exported to and imported from adjacent jurisdictions. In 
addition, it was argued that subnational governments were restricted in their ability to 
borrow thereby constraining their fiscal policy options. Furthermore, in cases where 
subnational governments have over-borrowed and central governments have assumed the 
servicing of the debt, macroeconomic stability has been compromised (Tanzi, 1995; 
Prud’homme, 1995). 
More recently, arguments have been put forward to support the capacity of fiscal 
decentralisation to enhance macrostability. First and foremost is the contention that the above 
arguments are based on the assumption that economic shocks are symmetrically distributed 
(Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, 2003). In circumstances in which macroeconomic shocks are 
actually asymmetrically distributed, subnational governments may be better situated to 
provide a policy response than the central government. A second argument develops from the 
notion that central governments in more centralised economies have relatively more 
responsibilities than those in decentralised economies, and that this may result in the central 
government being overburdened and less able to achieve efficient policy outcomes. Finally, 
Thornton (2007) contends that a shift in the share of revenues to subnational governments 
reduces the competition among subnational governments for fiscal resources. When 
subnational governments compete for revenue they destabilise national fiscal policy targets 
through the advancement of pro-cyclical fiscal policies.   9 
 
Previous empirical analyses of the impact of fiscal decentralisation on macroeconomic 
stability have produced mixed results. King and Ma (1999; 2001), Martinez-Vazquez and 
McNab (2003) and Neyapti (2004) all found that decentralised countries performed better in 
terms of inflation levels compared to centralised economies. On the other hand, Treisman 
(2000), Shah (2006) and Thornton (2007) all found that fiscal decentralisation had no 
statistically significant impact on the levels of inflation. 
2.3 Public Sector Size  
In his seminal paper, Tiebout (1956) argued that greater decentralisation, increasing the 
number of alternative fiscal jurisdictions, in conjunction with the mobility of citizens and 
their ability to vote with their feet, would ensure a limit to the excessive taxing power of 
governments. Brennan and Buchanan (1980) extended this theory through the concept of the 
‘Leviathan’ hypothesis: fiscal decentralisation acts as a constraint on the behaviour of 
monopolistic, revenue-maximising governments. Thus, it is expected that, other things being 
equal, the overall size of the public sector should be inversely related to the level of fiscal 
decentralisation.  
Alternatively, Oates (1985) provides two theoretical scenarios whereby fiscal 
decentralisation has a positive impact on the size of the public sector. First, the 
decentralisation of the provision of public goods from the central government to sub-central 
governments may result in the loss of economies of scale thereby increasing the cost of 
supplying a given quantity of goods, and tending ultimately to lead to an increase in the size 
of the public sector. Second, when competition among political parties is present, government 
policies tend to conform closely to the preferences of the voting population. In a centralised 10 
 
economy policies regarding public outlays would conform to the preferences of the overall 
median voter (the median of the entire population), whereas in a decentralised setting the 
policy choice would correspond to those of the median voter in each jurisdiction. Hence 
decentralisation provides the potential for the average level of outlays in a decentralised 
setting to surpass the average level in a centralised setting if the preferences of the median 
voters in the decentralised jurisdictions differ from those of the median voter overall. 
Previous empirical studies on the effect of fiscal decentralisation on public sector size have 
also produced mixed results. Oates (1985) tested the ‘Leviathan’ model for a group of 43 
countries and concluded that the hypothesis did not hold. Ebel and Yilmaz (2003), however, 
point out that Oates’s measure of fiscal decentralisation was narrowly based on the 
subnational share of total government expenditure. Using a number of alternative measures of 
fiscal decentralisation, these authors found that increasing subnational tax autonomy decreases 
public sector size, increasing subnational non-tax autonomy has the opposite effect, and 
measures of subnational fiscal dependency and sub-national tax sharing had no significant 
impact.
6  
Jin and Zou (2002) disaggregated government into national and subnational components, 
arguing that the relationship between decentralisation and public sector size may be different 
at each level. Using a panel of 35 developing and industrial countries, they found that 
expenditure decentralisation leads to smaller national governments, but larger government in 
aggregate. Revenue decentralisation, on the other hand, was found to decrease national 
government size by more than it increased subnational government size, resulting in a smaller 
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aggregate government. Finally, they found vertical fiscal imbalance increased the size of both 
subnational and national governments
7. 
Grossman (1992) analysed the impact of fiscal decentralisation on the size of the public 
sector in Australia over the period 1950 to 1984 and found it to have no significant effect. 
While the size of the Australian public sector as a whole grew considerably during that 
period, the relative size of State and Local government outlays remained almost constant, or 
even declined, depending on the measure of decentralisation employed. Three explanations 
for these Australia-specific results were proposed: the economic insignificance of local 
governments, the relative immobility of citizens, and the relatively small number of sub-
central governments.   
2.4 Budget Balance  
The effect of the structure of government on an economy’s fiscal budget balance is 
theoretically unclear. On the one hand, inter-jurisdictional competition in a decentralised 
economy has been argued to provide a constraint on the fiscal discipline of subnational 
governments (Tiebout, 1956) and would therefore produce a dampening effect on public debt 
(Freitag and Vatter, 2008). Alternatively, it has been argued that fiscal decentralisation 
involves expensive organisational and functional duplication as well as costly policy co-
ordination failures (Tanzi, 1995; Ter-Minassian, 1997) which induce subnational governments 
to spend inefficiently and beyond their means, thereby tending to result in deficits and higher 
costs of borrowing (de Mello, 2000).  
While empirical studies have produced varying results about the effect of fiscal 
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revenue.  12 
 
decentralisation on public debt, the majority of studies support the claim that decentralisation 
worsens the budget balance. However, these results are highly sensitive to the measure of 
fiscal decentralisation employed. Using basic measures of revenue and expenditure 
decentralisation, Fukasaku and de Mello (1998) and de Mello (2000) found decentralisation 
was associated with a bias towards deficits, as did Fornasari, Webb and Zou (2000) when 
measuring subnational government spending.
8 Rodden (2002) established that general 
government fiscal deficits are larger when subnational governments are both dependent on 
transfers and free to borrow. When controlling for periods of high and low economic growth, 
Freitag and Vatter (2008) found that in economic down-turns decentralised governments tend 
to implement more disciplined fiscal policy than centralised governments but, consistent with 
the findings of Stein (1999), found that in prosperous times the structure of the government 
had no significant effect on the economy’s budget balance. Ebel and Yilmaz (2003) argued that 
de Mello (2000) did not distinguish whether subnational governments had control over the tax 
rate or the tax base. When the measure of decentralisation redefined to take this into account, 
the level of decentralisation ceased to have a statistically significant effect on the size of the 
deficit. 
In an extension of these studies, Thornton and Mati (2008) measured the direct correlation 
between the fiscal balances of central and sub-central governments and found a statistically 
strong positive relationship, which appeared to be unrelated to the extent of fiscal 
decentralisation. Through the inclusion of the fiscal balance of the subnational level of 
government as a key explanatory variable, they found that fiscal decentralisation was not a 
                                                  
8 They also found that an increase in subnational spending had a corresponding increase in national spending. 13 
 
significant determinant of the fiscal balance of the central government. 
2.5 Physical Capital Investment  
In a dynamic context, Brueckner (1999), utilising the traditional Diamond (1965) over-
lapping generations (OLG) model, showed that fiscal decentralisation affects the incentive to 
save by changing the time path of after-tax income. However, in a subsequent paper 
Brueckner (2006) incorporated OLG in an endogenous growth model including human capital 
investment in the form of schooling which consumers can undertake when young to improve 
their earning power when old. This alternative model found that when moving from a 
unitary system of government to a federalist system there is a decrease in the incentive to 
save.
9 
In an empirical study of the impact of fiscal decentralisation on the long run share of 
investment in the GDP of high-income OECD countries, Thiessen (2003) found that 
c ountr ie s  w it h a  m e d ium d e gr ee  of fis c a l d e ce ntr a lis a t ion  ha ve , in the  lon g r un,  a  highe r 
investment share in GDP than either countries with a low or a high degree of fiscal 
decentralisation. In a detailed study of the effect of fiscal decentralisation on the composition 
of public investment in Europe, Kappeler and Valila (2008) found that fiscal decentralisation 
increases the share of relatively more productive investment in total public investment. They 
argue that fiscal decentralisation will result in more public investment in spill-over goods – 
such as infrastructure, hospitals, and schools – particularly where the spill-over effects of these 
investments are internalised by capital transfers from central governments.  
                                                  
9 Savings levels could be restored via a corresponding reduction in the level of human capital investment. While 
this may have a positive effect on the level of savings it ultimately has a negative effect on economic growth 
through the reduction in human capital investment. 14 
 
2.6 Income Distribution  
Theoretical studies have found fiscal decentralisation to have both positive and negative 
effects on income distribution. On the one hand, authors such as Prud’homme (1995) and 
Neyapti (2006) contend that a centralised government system provides a more balanced 
distribution of income by directing resources from relatively richer regions to poorer regions. 
Furthermore, Ezcurra and Pascual (2008) argue that regional disparities generate differentials 
in revenue raising capacities amongst regions, causing income gaps, and fiscal decentralisation 
weakens the ability of the central government to perform an equalisation role in fiscal policy. 
On the other hand, it has been argued that local governments have the specific knowledge to 
provide the most efficient allocation of resources (Oates, 1991). Shankar and Shah (2003) 
maintain that the ability of local governments to stay in power depends on their ability to 
realise a level of development and economic growth similar to that enjoyed by other local 
jurisdictions. This ensures that less advanced regions have an incentive to act competitively 
and offer policies, such as a more flexible labour market, to increase the overall level of 
development. 
Qiao et al. (2008) developed a theoretical model to analyse the correlation between fiscal 
decentralisation and income inequality. This model was then employed in an empirical 
analysis of China and it was established that fiscal decentralisation has led to a significant 
increase in regional inequality. In addition, they also provided evidence to support the 
hypothesis that there exists a trade-off between economic growth and regional equality in 
China. Zhang (2006) also considered this potential trade-off in the context of China and 
contended that fiscal decentralisation exacerbated the high costs of tax collection in poorer 15 
 
regions, particularly those with a large dependence on agriculture. Similar results were 
produced by Bonet (2006) in an investigation of Columbia’s fiscal decentralisation experience. 
Neyapti (2006), however, analysed the relationship between fiscal decentralisation and income 
equality across 37 countries and found that when a country was governed successfully, 
revenue decentralisation had the potential to improve income distribution, a result consistent 
with the conclusions of Ezcurra and Pascual (2008). 
 
3. Empirical methodology and data 
Consistent with prominent previous studies, such as Xie et al. (1999), the impact of fiscal 
decentralisation on the value of the macroeconomic variable of interest is estimated by means 
of ordinary least squares regressions of the following form: 
  tt t t g γd ε ′ =+ + βx  (1) 
where gt is the value of the macroeconomic variable of interest in period t = 1972, ..., 2005. 
The vector xt contains a set of control variables that are useful in explaining the determinants 
of the macroeconomic variable, including a constant term. The variable dt is a measure of 
fiscal decentralisation and  t ε  is the error term, both in period t. Interest focuses upon the sign 
and statistical significance of the estimate of parameter γ  in the regression of various 
macroeconomic variables gt. against various measures of fiscal decentralisation dt . Equation (1) 
is estimated for time-series data in the period 1972-2005 for the aggregate Australian economy.  
The selection of the control variables to be included in the vector xt is guided mainly by 
previous empirical studies. However, in each model potential control variables that are 
statistically insignificant from zero are excluded provided the validity of these exclusions is 16 
 
supported by the results of a redundant-variables-F-test. Following this, the model is then 
tested for omitted variable bias by means of the Ramsey RESET test. Moreover, the Durbin-
Watson statistic is used to test for serial correlation, and the Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange 
Multiplier statistic is used to test for the presence of autocorrelation. 
In the case of the State-level analysis of the impact of decentralisation in Australia on State-
level economic growth, both cross-sectional and panel estimation techniques were used. Cross-
sectional techniques were used to analyse the effect of fiscal decentralisation on income 
distribution. Using the cross-sectional data, ordinary least squares regressions of the following 
form were estimated: 
  ii i i s θd ε ′ =+ + δx  (2) 
where st is either the growth of gross state product (GSP) per capita or a measure of income 
distribution for State i = 1,...,8. Again, the vector xi contains a set of control variables that are 
useful in explaining the determinants of the growth of GSP per capita or inequity. The 
variable di is a measure of fiscal decentralisation and  i ε  is the error, both in State i. Following 

















This measure uses relative GSP per capita as a proxy for the share of fiscal resources. With full 
income equality, a State’s share of fiscal resources equals its share of the country’s population 
and the relative share of fiscal resources assigned to each State equals one.  17 
 
For the panel data, a fixed-effects model of the following form is estimated: 
  α it i it it it s θd ε ′ =+ + + δx  (4) 
where sit is the growth of gross state product (GSP) per capita for State i = 1,...,8 in period t = 
1990, ..., 2006. The parameters  i α  represents State-fixed effects. The vector xit contains a set of 
control variables that are useful in explaining State economic growth. The variable dit is a 
measure of fiscal decentralisation and  it ε  is the error term, both for State i in period t.   
Economic theory suggests that last period’s growth has an impact on current period 
economic growth and hence a one period lag of GSP should be included in equation (4). 
However, to include a lagged value of the dependent variable into the panel data analysis 
would make the fixed effects estimator both biased and inconsistent since the lagged 
dependent variable is correlated with the error term (Verbeek, 2004). Hence a dynamic panel 
is required. To solve the inconsistency problem, the dynamic panel begins by taking the first 
difference of equation (4) to remove the individual effects. However, the lagged dependent 
variable,  ,1 − it s , and the lagged error term,  ,1 it ε −  remain correlated even as the number of time 
periods approaches infinity, suggesting that the instrumental variable approach needs to be 
utilised. Often, the second lag of the dependent variable,  ,2 − it s , is employed as the 
instrumental variable since it is correlated with  ,1 ,2 () −− − it it ss  but not  ,1 it ε − .10 To account for 
the reduction in the number of observations lost in the estimation, a general method of 
moments (GMM) approach is often used. In the present study, the Arellano and Bond (1991) 
GMM method of estimating dynamic panel data models was employed. The conclusions were 
similar to those achieved when using the fixed effects model described above. Consequently, 
for simplicity and ease of understanding, the results from the fixed effects model only are 
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reported. 
The robustness of “growth regression” methods has been a particularly contentious issue in 
recent times (Levine and Renelt, 1992; Bleaney and Nishiyama, 2002; Sala-i-Martin et al., 
2004). There is no consensus on what method that should be employed to determine which 
variables have a significant effect on economic growth.
11 Consequently, model uncertainty is 
arguably the most significant limitation of traditional estimation procedures. Typically 
individual researchers develop a single model (or small set of models) and undertake inference 
as if that model had generated the data. Such procedures ignore the uncertainty that surrounds 
the validity of the model when it is not known exactly which model is the correct one, and 
thus, sequential testing procedures can lead to considerably misleading inferences (Hodges, 
1987; Draper, 1995). This issue can be addressed by using Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) to 
test the robustness of the results. The rationale behind BMA is relatively straightforward. 
When there is more than one model that fits the data well, but models produce conflicting 
coefficient estimates and standard errors, taking a weighted average of the potential models is 
superior to choosing just one “best” model and discarding the remainder (Fernandez et al., 
2001a). Distributions for the regression coefficients are calculated by averaging the posterior 
density of each of the models considered and using their posterior model probabilities as 
weights (Koop, 2003). These weights are closely related to the predictive ability of the models 
and, as such, provide a more formal approach to model uncertainty than the traditional 
approaches (Temple, 2000). It should be noted, however, that BMA is not without its critics. 
                                                  
11 Growth econometrics suffers from a number of other well documented problems, including: endogeneity, 
parameter heterogeneity, data quality, the problems associated with pre-test estimators, and the inability to 
address the issue of model uncertainty. See Durlauf et al. (2005) for an extensive review of these issues. 19 
 
Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) maintain that the impact of the choice of prior on the results in 
BMA analyses has not been sufficiently investigated and this choice may have significant, 
unexplored consequences.
12 In the present study this problem is addressed by employing a 
benchmark prior distribution proposed by Fernandez et al. (2001a) that they show to have 
very little impact on posterior results.
13  
The selection of an appropriate measure of fiscal decentralisation is a critical difficulty 
encountered in empirical analysis of fiscal federalism, and there is no consensus in the 
literature on any one “true” measure of fiscal decentralisation. Consequently, two broad types 
of measures of fiscal decentralisation are considered in the present study, standard measures 
and corrected measures.
14   
Standard measures of fiscal decentralisation are calculated from data on government 
expenditure share, government revenue share and tax revenue share.
15 Whilst these standard 
measures do not capture the complexity of fiscal relations, they do provide a basic impression 
of how much authority sub-central governments possess and how this has evolved over time. 
Corrected measures of fiscal decentralisation seek to capture the level of autonomy – 
particularly tax autonomy – sub-central governments have over their own actions. OECD 
(2005) developed an analytical framework for classifying subnational taxes in order of fiscal 
autonomy by considering three principal aspects: tax administration, the attribution of tax 
receipts, and legislative competencies to determine the tax rate and tax base. Following this 
                                                  
12 More recently, Eicher et al. (2007) have attempted to provide guidance on the most accurate choice of prior in 
economic models. 
13 The BMA equations are presented in Appendix B. 
14 See Appendix A for a description of the measures of fiscal decentralisation employed in this study.  
15 Standard measures have been used studies by Jin and Zou (2002); Triesman (2002); Martinez-Vazquez and 
McNab (2003); Stegarescu (2005); Neyapti, (2006); Akai et al. (2007); Bjornskov et al. (2008), amongst other. 20 
 
framework, a number of measures of fiscal decentralisation have been developed. For 
example, Ebel and Yilmaz (2003) derived a measure of tax autonomy by summing the taxes 
that accrue under the top three classifications provided by OECD (2005), and weighting each 
tax by their corresponding share of total tax revenue. Another set of corrected measures seeks 
to measure the degree of centralisation. For example, Arzaghi and Henderson (2005) suggested 
the share of central government consumption expenditure to total government consumption 
expenditure would provide an indicator of expenditure centralisation.
16  
As previously mentioned the analysis is undertaken on both the aggregate and State levels. 
At the aggregate level, the data set covers the 33 year period of 1972 to 2005. A majority of the 
time-series data was taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators and the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics databases.
17 It has been argued that the relationship between 
economic growth and fiscal decentralisation is not a short-term relationship. Davoodi and 
Zou (1998) asserted that the benefits and costs of fiscal decentralisation are not expected to 
affect year-to-year fluctuations in growth, and proposed estimating the regression on data 
averaged over five and ten year periods. Meloche et al. (2004) suggested using a centred three-
year moving average (3-year MA) to smooth the fluctuations from the data. Given the small 
sample size and consequent restricted degrees of freedom, a three-year moving average was 
chosen for the present study in order to maintain a reasonable number of data points.
18 For 
robustness, growth results are reported when the model is estimated both on a year-by-year 
                                                  
16 A further set of measures has also been utilised by past authors. These alternative measures seek to capture a 
‘comprehensive system’ consisting not only of revenue and expenditure policies, but other aspects that consider 
the decision making powers at different levels of government. See Triesman (2002) and Sutherland et al. (2005). 
17 See Table A1 for a complete description of the data and its sources.   
18 A Hodrick-Prescott filter was also tried as a data smoothing technique.  However, this implies some truncation 
of the data set and produced data that was too smooth and thus provided unreliable results. 21 
 
basis (short-term analysis) and on a centred three-year moving average basis (medium-term 
analysis). At the State level, the data are arranged in both cross-section and panel structures. 
The cross-section data covers the post-Goods and Services Tax (GST) period of 2000 to 2005 
for the six states and two major self-governing territories. In order to improve the number of 
observations in the data set, the panel data set covers the period 1990 to 2006, increasing the 
total number of observations to 136.  A majority of the data was taken from the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics database. Given the differences in data coverage, care must be taken when 
comparing the aggregate and state level results. Summary statistics for both the aggregate and 
state level data are presented in Table A2 of the appendix.  
 
4. Empirical Results 
 4.1 Aggregate Analysis 
In this section, the results of the estimation of the effects of fiscal decentralisation on four 
macroeconomic variables and economic growth are presented. A total of 16 measures of 
decentralisation have been utilised in this study. To conserve space only the most noteworthy 
results
19 are reported. In general, to allow comparability with previous studies, the results of 
models including the basic revenue and expenditure share measures as well as the average of 
these two measures are reported. 
  Table 1 reports the estimated impact of fiscal decentralisation on macroeconomic stability 
measured via the level of inflation.
20 All measures of revenue decentralisation were found to 
                                                  
19 A summary of the results are reported in Tables 12 and 13. Full results are available on request.   
20 The misery index – the sum of the rates of inflation and unemployment- was also used as a measure of 
macroeconomic stability and the signs and statistical significance of the decentralisation variables were consistent 22 
 
have a significant negative effect on the level of inflation while expenditure decentralisation 
has no statistically significant effect. These results are consistent with those of King and Ma 
(2001), Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2003) and Neyapti (2004). Since tax revenue has a 
relatively large share in total subnational revenues the significant negative sign on the 
coefficient of the measure of subnational governments’ share of total government tax revenue 
(Tax share: Central total) implies that the transference of tax powers to lower levels of 
government is a driving force behind the dampening effect of revenue decentralisation on 
Australia’s rate of inflation. This is particularly important given the State governments’ largest 
source of taxation revenue is now GST, a central government controlled tax. The three 
measures of sub-central government fiscal autonomy are also found to have a statistically 
significant negative relationship with inflation.  
[Table 1] 
Results of the effect of fiscal decentralisation on public sector size are reported in Table 2. 
In contrast to Grossman’s (1992) results, expenditure decentralisation was found to have a 
positive effect on the size of the public sector in Australia. This disparity in findings can most 
likely be attributed to the two alternative time periods under consideration: Grossman 
analysed the period 1950 to 1984 whereas the present analysis is between 1972 and 2005. A 
relatively high level of centralisation persisted in Australia until movements towards 
privatisation and microeconomic reform began in the 1970s and 1980s. The corresponding 
devolution of government powers generally continued until the introduction of the GST and 
the subsequent centralisation of government responsibilities in Australia. Thus, the evolution 
                                                                                                                                                          
with those obtained from the inflation analysis. Results are available upon request.  23 
 
of decentralisation during Grossman’s time period is quite different to that of the time period 
analysed here.  
The results of expenditure decentralisation suggest that, from a budgetary perspective, fiscal 
decentralisation may result in the loss of economies of scale and subsequently increase the cost 
of supply and thus the size of the public sector. In addition to the sub-central governments’ 
share of total government expenditure, the measures of tax and revenue autonomy also have 
significant positive coefficients. These results indicate that decentralisation of decision making 
and responsibilities not only increases the relative size and power of the sub-central 
governments, it also increases the size of the Australian government as a whole. 
[Table 2] 
Table 3 presents the results of the effect of decentralisation on the budget balance, 
measured by the annual change in the fiscal balance of the central government (as a percentage 
of GDP). Both sub-central government revenue and expenditure shares, and consequently the 
average of the two, were found to have a significant relationship with Australia’s budget 
balance. While increases in the sub-central governments’ share of total government revenue 
was found to improve the budget balance, increases in the sub-central governments’ share of 
total government expenditure was found to have the opposite effect. The relationship between 
expenditure and revenue measures and budget balance can be explained by the positive 
coefficient on subnational fiscal balances. This result indicates that as the subnational 
governments’ budget balance improves there is a corresponding improvement in the central 
government’s fiscal balance. Thus, an increase in subnational revenue and a decrease in 
subnational expenditure would have an indirect positive impact on the central government’s 24 
 
budget balance. Note that the negative and significant coefficients on growth indicate that 
Australian fiscal policies have been countercyclical on average.  
[Table 3] 
The final macroeconomic variable tested for a relationship with fiscal decentralisation was 
physical capital investment. The results are summarised in Table 4. The standard common 
measures of revenue and expenditure decentralisation were found to have no statistically 
significant impact on the rate of physical investment in Australia. However, a significant 
negative effect of decentralisation was detected when decentralisation was represented by 
means of autonomy measures. One possible explanation for this result is the increase in “red 
tape” and cross-border inconsistencies that arises when sub-central governments have a 
relatively larger influence on tax and regulation policies. Firms seeking to invest may well be 
hindered by the extra costs involved when such barriers exist. As a further point of interest, 
unlike the case of the three macroeconomic conditions analysed previously, the measure of 
vertical fiscal imbalance was found to be statistically significant in the case of investment. 
Vertical imbalance is a measure of centralisation and hence, its positive effect on investment is 
consistent with the results obtained using the decentralisation indicators.  
[Table 4] 
Having tested for indirect influences of fiscal decentralisation on economic performance 
using four important macroeconomic variables, the analysis now turns to testing for a direct 
impact of fiscal decentralisation on GDP growth, firstly considering short-term (year on year) 
economic growth. Since model specification is a central issue for growth econometrics of the 
sort undertaken in this study the steps employed to come to the chosen specification are 25 
 
described. The base model specification is the commonly accepted Barro-type growth 
equations employed in previous studies (e.g. Barro, 1991). Due to the limited degrees of 
freedom available, the control variables included in the regression equation were determined 
by backward elimination. A redundant variables test was performed on regressors that did not 
have a significant relationship with economic growth, as determined by individual t-tests – 
namely, the lag of the dependent variable, investment, trade, and gross domestic savings. The 
null hypothesis that the coefficients are jointly zero was not rejected at the 1% level of 
significance and these potential regressors were excluded from the model.  
Owing to the nature of growth regressions, endogeneity and simultaneity between the 
dependent and explanatory variables can be a problem. Suggestive evidence of an endogeneity 
problem was indicated by the rejection of correct model specification at the 1% level of 
significance found using a Ramsey RESET test. A Hausman test for endogeneity performed 
on the explanatory variables indicated that there was an endogeneity problem between 
consumption (expenditure share in GDP) and GDP growth. To correct this problem a one 
period lag of consumption was employed as simple instrumental variable on the basis of the 
life-cycle permanent income hypothesis which states that last period’s consumption provides 
an accurate prediction of current consumption. An individual significance test confirmed that 
a one period lag of consumption had a significant relationship with economic growth but 
preliminary regression results indicated that this model had low explanatory power. Thus, the 
second lag of consumption was also included. A significance test and a Ramsey RESET test 
confirmed the significance of the second lag. Finally, using the Breusch-Godfrey LM test the 26 
 
hypothesis of no serial correlation could not be rejected.
21 The results using the chosen model 
specification are presented in Table 5. 
[Table 5]   
Of the 16 measures of fiscal decentralisation employed, only sub-central governments’ tax 
revenue share of total revenue produced a statistically significant (negative) coefficient. 
Overwhelming, the results indicate that, as argued by Davoodi and Zou (1998), fiscal 
decentralisation has little or no significant impact on short-term economic growth.  
Next the analysis considers whether the short-term results generalise to the medium-term. 
In the interests of consistency and ease of interpretation, the medium-term model was 
specified using the same control variables as used in the short-term analysis with one 
exception.
22 The Ramsey RESET test on the model without the lagged consumption variable 
indicated that this model was well specified; suggesting that employing the 3-year moving 
average removed the endogeneity problem inherent in the year-to-year approach. The results 
are presented in Table 6. 
[Table 6]   
In contrast to the results obtained using the short-term measure, this model has high 
explanatory power with a number of decentralisation and explanatory variables producing 
significant coefficients. Both the standard measures of revenue decentralisation (revenue share) 
and expenditure decentralisation (expenditure share) exhibited significant relationships with 
medium-term Australian economic growth. An increase in Australian sub-central 
                                                  
21 A Sargan test for instrument validity was also performed and verified the appropriateness of the instrument 
specification chosen). 
22 One should note, however, that the results did not change when the three-year moving average model was 
specified differently from the year-to-year model. These results are available upon request.    27 
 
governments’ share of total government expenditure was estimated to have a negative impact 
on economic growth, perhaps suggesting that increasing decentralisation overburdens State 
governments with expenditure responsibilities to the extent that they cannot perform 
effectively. Furthermore, potential loss of economies of scale and subsequent increases in the 
cost of supply can reduce the efficiency of the public sector to the detriment of economic 
growth. On the other hand, increasing the sub-central governments’ share of total 
government revenue was found to increase medium-term economic growth on average. This 
result, in conjunction with the significant negative coefficient on the average measure, suggests 
that to enhance economic growth the central government needs to assume a larger share of 
expenditure responsibilities and the sub-central governments require larger revenue sources. 
The significant negative coefficient on the average measure of decentralisation indicates that 
merely increasing revenue proportionately to a reduction in expenditure still has a detrimental 
effect on medium-term economic growth. Consistent with the basic measure of revenue 
decentralisation, both tax autonomy and the corrected measure of revenue decentralisation are 
found to have positive relationships with medium-term economic growth in Australia.  
The positive coefficient on non-tax share suggests that increasing sub-central governments’ 
non-tax share of total revenue has a favourable effect on Australian economic growth. Non-
tax revenue consists primarily of user charges and administrative fees and hence is considered 
“own source” revenue. Accordingly, the results suggest that increasing the revenues over 
which State and Local governments have full discretion enhances economic growth in the 
medium-term. Finally, it is found that increasing the local government share of total 
government expenditure has, on average, a positive effect on growth. The coefficient on the 28 
 
States’ share, however, is not statistically different from zero. This result is somewhat 
surprising given the negative sign on the coefficient of total sub-central government 
expenditure share. Nonetheless, the results imply that although State and Local governments 
combined have too much expenditure responsibility in a decentralised economy, increasing 
just grassroots, local governments’ share would enhance economic growth in the medium-
term.  
Overall, only 7 of the 16 measures of decentralisation are found to have statistically 
significant effects on medium-term economic growth. Such results indicate that the view that 
fiscal decentralisation is growth-enhancing is not supported by the data. However, some 
evidence is supportive of the notion that targeted decentralisation could promote economic 
growth in Australia. 
As a final exercise at the aggregate level, the robustness of the growth results is tested by 
utilising Bayesian Model Averaging.
23 The data comprise 30 potential explanatory variables of 
Australian economic growth over the period 1972-2005. The results reported are from 1 
million recorded draws after 500,000 burn-in replications to account for the starting value of 
the chain. Table 7 presents the posterior means and standard deviations as well as the marginal 
posterior probabilities of inclusion for each explanatory variable. Masanjala and Papageorgiou 
(2008) contend that the absolute value of the ratio of the posterior mean to its standard 
deviation provides a better measure than the posterior inclusion probability to determine 
whether an explanatory variable achieves economic and statistical significance in a model. The 
results are examined using both measures to identify variable effectiveness. Fernandez et al. 
                                                  
23 Full details are presented in Appendix B.  29 
 
(2001a) determine a variable to be an effective determinant of GDP growth per capita if its 
posterior probability of inclusion is greater than 0.1. Conversely, Raftery (1995) suggests that 
0.5 is an appropriate threshold. Raftery’s threshold is approximately equivalent to requiring a 
ratio of posterior mean to standard deviation of 1. This is also the threshold applied in 
Masanjala and Papageorgiou (2008). Since there is no consensus in the BMA literature about 
the correct threshold Table 7 indicates which variables cross each threshold. 
[Table 7] 
Using the threshold suggested by Raftery, the results indicate that consumption 
expenditure, the unemployment rate, and the secondary school enrolment rate are the only 
explanatory variables that provide significant explanatory power in the aggregate model. 
Under the Fernandez et al. (2001a) threshold, population growth, government consumption, 
domestic savings, and taxation revenue can also be considered significant determinants of 
economic growth in Australia. Such results are consistent with the statistical significance 
achieved by the variables included in the model of medium-term economic growth and 
support the model specification used in the benchmark models estimated via classical 
estimation techniques.  
The posterior results of the measures of fiscal decentralisation are presented in Table 8. 
These results suggest that no indicator of decentralisation is likely to have an important 
contribution to economic growth in Australia under the threshold suggested by Raftery. 
However, 5 of the 16 fiscal measures do satisfy the Fernandez et al. (2001a) threshold. The 
highest probability of inclusion is achieved by the tax autonomy: sub-central total measure at 
34.51 percent. Only 2 of these 5 measures – revenue share: total and tax autonomy: central 30 
 
total – were also estimated to have a statistical significant effect on economic growth using 
classical estimation. Such results reinforce the weak relationship between fiscal 
decentralisation and medium-term economic growth estimated above. Consequently, the 
results generally appear robust to the estimation techniques employed. 
[Table 8] 
4.2 State-Level Analysis 
Since failure to take account of the cultural, institutional, demographic, and economic 
differences across regions could result in biased and uninformative conclusions, the analysis is 
broadened to examine smaller political units as recommended by Stansel (2005). Hence, in this 
section the effect of fiscal decentralisation on income distribution and economic growth is 
examined using data for Australia’s 8 regions.  
Per capita GDP in Australia is the most even of any democratic federation across its States 
(McLean, 2004). However, there is clear evidence of diverging per capita output since the mid-
1970s (Cashin, 1995; Neri, 1998; Nguyen et al., 2003). Figure 1 highlights the inequality in 
income distribution across the States of Australia over the 2000 to 2005 period.
24 It can be seen 
that ACT has the most significant portion of fiscal resources, largely at the expense of 
Tasmania, Queensland, and South Australia.  
Table 9 presents the results of the estimated effect of decentralisation on distribution of 
fiscal resources. Of the three decentralisation measures, only sub-central government 
investment share of total government investment was found to have a significant relationship 
                                                  
24 The shorter time period and limited number of decentralisation measures compared to the aggregate analysis is 
owing to a lack of statistical information consistently measured in each state. Consequently, the results obtained 
using the basic measures employed in this study provides a solid grounding for future research. Furthermore, one 
should note that as the ACT does not have local governments it is given a value of zero for local decentralisation 
as an indication of complete centralisation. 31 
 
with fiscal distribution. Given that government investment represents the most productive 
part of public expenditure (Carrion-i-Silvestre et al., 2008) it is unsurprising that the effect of 
decentralisation measured via investment shares on income distribution is higher when 
compared to the standard measures based on expenditure or revenue shares. The positive 
coefficient on investment share measure suggests that as the sub-central governments’ share of 
total government investment increases, inequity across Australian States also increases. This 
result arises because centralisation of fiscal resources ensures a minimum degree of horizontal 
fiscal balance, particularly in Australia since the main objective of the Commonwealth Grants 
Commission is to achieve fiscal equalisation across the States. Centralising government 
decision making and responsibilities provides a more balanced income distribution as the 
central government is able to redirect resources to relatively poorer States. Thus, 
decentralising fiscal resources does not allow the central government to perform an 
equalisation role in fiscal policy. However, overall the evidence that fiscal decentralisation 
leads to greater income inequality is not strong.   
[Table 9] 
The impact of fiscal decentralisation on State economic growth is examined by employing 
the data in two forms. The cross-section analysis is limited in its interpretations as it suffers 
from a significant lack of degrees of freedom. Hence panel data techniques are applied to the 
period 1990 to 2006 to provide an examination of both the individual (State) and time 
relationship between growth and fiscal decentralisation, while the results of the cross-sectional 
analysis are presented for comparison. 
The cross-sectional results are presented in Table 10. To control for endogeneity, the initial 32 
 
values (2000 value) of explanatory and decentralisation variables were regressed on the average 
of GSP over the period 2000 to 2005. Of the 6 measures of fiscal decentralisation employed, 
only sub-central governments’ share of total government tax revenue was found to be a 
significant determinant of state economic growth. This result is consistent with the sign and 
significance on the Tax share: sub-central total measure estimated using aggregated data. 
However, at both the aggregate and state levels, only one significant measure of 
decentralisation was found. Consequently, the cross-sectional analysis indicates a very weak, if 
any, relationship between decentralisation and economic growth at the aggregate or state 
levels.  
[Table 10] 
The panel data results are presented in Table 11. A Hausman (1978) specification test was 
conducted to test the null hypothesis that the random effects model is unbiased and the null 
was rejected at the 1% level of significance, indicating a fixed effects model was appropriate. 
Furthermore, the existence of individual or time effects does not need to be addressed for a 
panel data model of Australian States as the interpretation of the fixed effects as State dummy 
variables precludes this requirement (Gujarati, 2003). The assumptions of homoskedasticity 
and no serial correlation were also tested to further ensure the choice of a fixed effects model 
specification was correct. Bhargava et al. (1983) developed a generalisation of the Durbin-
Watson statistic to test for the presence of autocorrelation in panel data models and Verbeek 
(2004) derived a variant of the Breusch-Pagan test to test for heteroskedasticity in panel data 
models.  However, Wooldridge (2002) contends that when analysing fixed effects models that 
are akin to including dummy variables, the idiosyncratic errors (errors across States) are 33 
 
constant. This means that the fixed effects are efficient and the assumptions of 
heteroskedasticity and no serial correlation hold.  
[Table 11] 
The results indicate that three decentralisation variables have a significant relationship with 
state economic growth: namely the local share of tax revenue, sub-central governments’ share 
of tax revenue, and the local governments’ share of sub-central government tax revenue. 
Taken together, these results suggest that the negative effect of decentralisation on state 
growth comes from decentralisation at the local level, implying that the extent of local 
governments’ share of power and responsibility is having a negative impact on economic 
growth. Unlike at the aggregate level, none of the State measures of decentralisation is found 
to have a positive effect on state economic growth. This is the opposite result to that found at 
the regional level in Spain by Carrion-i-Silvestre et al. (2008), suggesting that country-specific 
analyses, both at the aggregate and local levels, are important in determining the nature of any 
relationship between fiscal decentralisation and economic growth. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper analysed the effect of fiscal decentralisation on the Australian economy as a 
whole as well as at the level of the States. It argued that it was essential to study the effect of 
fiscal decentralisation on key macroeconomic variables which determine the economic 
environment within which growth occurs as well as on economic growth itself. Employing 
sixteen measures of fiscal decentralisation, the analysis found a number of conflicting results, 
summarised in Table 12, about the effects of decentralisation on these key Australian 34 
 
macroeconomic variables. Overall the results suggest that decentralisation tends to enhance 
macroeconomic stability and increase the size of the Australian public sector. Decentralisation 
of expenditure and centralisation of revenue collection were found to improve Australia’s 
vertical fiscal imbalance and stabilise central, State, and local government budgets. Increasing 
State and local governments’ own source revenue was found to decrease investment in 
Australia while the relative size of State and local governments’ revenue and expenditure did 
not appear to have significant effects. As expected, fiscal decentralisation did not appear to 
affect economic growth in the short-term. When analysing medium-term growth the results 
were mixed, but on balance suggest that, while expenditure decentralisation tends to decrease 
Australia’s medium-term rate of economic growth, revenue decentralisation, the 
decentralisation of state and local governments’ own source and non-tax revenue, and the 
decentralisation of government expenditure to the local level tend to increase the growth rate. 
Nine other indicators of decentralisation were found to have no relationship with economic 
growth.  
The State level results, summarised in Table 13, suggest that, on some measures, fiscal 
decentralisation may tend to increase the inequity of income distribution across the States and 
to retard economic growth. For the majority of measures employed, however, no such 
relationship could be detected. Such results suggest that there are many ways in which fiscal 
decentralisation can affect the economy, with the outcome depending on the type of 
decentralisation undertaken. Now that some of these effects have been empirically identified 
the next step is a better theoretical understanding of why these relationships exist and what 
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Table 1: Macroeconomic stability (Inflation) regressions for Australia, 1972-2005  




- -16.35096     
[0.0007]*** 




-  -  -11.5463   
[0.4855] 




-  -  -  -16.75089   
[0.0011]*** 
- - - 
Tax autonomy: 
Central total  
 




Sub-central total  
 











0.27364   
[0.9199] 
0.763482   
[0.7305] 
-0.24242   
[0.9322] 
0.487238   
[0.8148] 
-2.648546   
[0.2951] 
-3.87259   
[0.2082] 
-1.66953   
[0.4823] 
GDP per capita 
 
 
-3.676378   
[0.0005]*** 
-2.61953   
[0.0009]*** 
-3.809267   
[0.0002]*** 
-4.076715   
[0.0000]*** 









1.87998   
[0.4782] 
-2.055912   
[0.3197] 
1.490668   
[0.5557] 
-1.899763   
[0.3284] 
-1.468228   
[0.4428] 
-0.455063   
[0.7988] 





-2.423461   
[0.6664] 
-9.171023   
[0.0671]* 
-3.254606   
[0.5201] 
-13.05881   
[0.0427]** 
-12.39703   
[0.0333]** 
-9.661798   
[0.0719]* 
-11.41014   
[0.0261] 
∆ Fiscal balance: 
Central gov’t 
 
0.996889   
[0.0139]** 
1.180532   
[0.0007]*** 
1.030251   
[0.0108]** 
1.16872   
[0.0009]*** 
1.31714   
[0.0006]*** 
1.329806   
[0.0011]*** 
1.280837   
[0.0004] 
Inflation (-1)  0.52746 
[0.0000]*** 




0.340439   
[0.0080]*** 
0.388783   
[0.0033]*** 
0.449308   
[0.0006]*** 
0.364647   
[0.0061] 
Adj-R
2  0.833085 0.867684 0.829954 0.873337 0.862526 0.848029 0.866244 
Prob (F-
statistic) 
0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
Notes: Dependent variable: Inflation. In square brackets, p -values  based on heteroscedastic-consistent (White-robust) standard errors are 
reported. Asterisks indicate variables that are significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels. Total number of observations is 33. 
Initial results suggested that openness to trade and government consumption were individually statistically insignificant. Before dropping 
these variables, a redundant variables F-test was performed to test the hypothesis that the coefficients on the two variables are jointly zero. 
The resulting low F-statistic led to the removal of these two explanatory variables from the model. The re-estimated model, however, 
exhibited signs of a potential serial correlation problem, as was indicated by a low Durbin-Watson statistic. Thus, to eradicate this problem, a 
lag of the dependent variable was included as an explanatory variable. An individual significance test confirmed that last period’s inflation is a 
significant determinant of current inflation. A Ramsey RESET test was also performed to confirm the specified model was unbiased and 
consistent, and inferences using least squares (LS) were valid. Finally, the Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange Multiplier statistic was obtained to 
check for the presence of residual autocorrelation; there was insufficient evidence to reject the null of no serial correlation. 40 
 
Table 2: Public sector size regressions for Australia, 1972-2005 




0.005153   
[0.8761] 




-  0.039000   
[0.0391]** 




- -  -0.000608     
[0.9925] 




-  -  -  0.032552   
[0.4338] 
- - - 
Tax autonomy: 
Central total  
 




Sub-central total  
 











0.043620   
[0.5033] 
0.043487   
[0.4503] 
0.040445   
[0.5313] 
0.057046   
[0.4041] 
0.121021   
[0.0411]** 
0.133015   
[0.0352]** 





0.157446   
[0.0142]** 
0.141491   
[0.0293]** 
0.155651   
[0.0152]** 
0.171299   
[0.0083]*** 
0.14976   
[0.0143]** 
0.110509   
[0.0899]* 





-0.682295   
[0.0286]** 
-0.56017   
[0.0874]* 
-0.669632   
[0.0313]** 
-0.755206   
[0.0139]** 
-0.534611   
[0.0767]* 
-0.28088   
[0.4215] 
























-0.665933   
[0.0001]*** 
-0.675917   
[0.0001]*** 
-0.665471   
[0.0001]*** 
-0.667638   
[0.0001]*** 
-0.693235   
[0.0000]*** 





2  0.786391  0.796651 0.786312 0.788561 0.816275 0.814663 0.821186 
Prob (F-
statistic) 
0.000000  0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
Notes: Dependent variable: Gov’t expenditure. In square brackets, p-values based on heteroscedastic-consistent (White-robust) 
standard errors are reported. Asterisks indicate variables that are significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels. Total 
number of observations is 32. The base model employed follows the specification of Grossman (1992). Both the log-log and 
linear-log forms of this model did not reject the null of correct specification so the log-log model was chosen on the basis of 
Akaike and Schwarz criterion. The presence of autocorrelation was identified by a small Durbin-Watson statistic. 
Consequently, a lag of the dependent variable was included in the base equation. However, the Breusch-Godfrey LM test still 
detected the existence of serial correlation in the model, so a second lag of the dependent variable was incorporated. 
Estimation of the Ramsey RESET test and Breusch-Godfrey LM test indicated the resultant model did not show signs of 
omitted variables or serial correlation.  41 
 
 
Table 3: Budget balance regressions for Australia, 1972-2005 




0.122002   
[0.0265]** 




- -0.131271     
[0.0205]** 




- -  0.209259     
[0.0134]** 





-  -  -  0.161797   
[0.1649] 
- - - 
Tax autonomy: 
Central total  
 













- - - - - -  -0.939773     
[0.9426] 
∆ Fiscal Balance: 
sub-Central gov’t
 
0.431805   
[0.0582]* 
0.431721   
[0.0563]* 
0.472993   
[0.0356]** 
0.387187   
[0.1095] 
0.450575   
[0.0856]* 
0.382029   
[0.1245] 





-18.36574   
[0.0200]** 
-16.42781   
[0.0321]** 
-18.56493   
[0.0165]** 
-17.0045   
[0.0388]** 
-15.34227   
[0.0667]* 
-14.0493   
[0.0890]* 





-0.021508   
[0.6022] 
-0.020079   
[0.6239] 
-0.02506   
[0.5335] 
-0.022076   
[0.6151] 
-0.03143   
[0.4864] 
-0.032662   
[0.4606] 
-0.031405   
[0.4874] 
Debt (-1)  1.922768   
[0.2093] 
2.637065   
[0.1017] 
1.866617   
[0.2103] 
1.831285   
[0.2626] 
1.369815   
[0.4266] 
0.854914   
[0.6057] 
1.34664   
[0.4419] 
Adj-R
2  0.231886 0.244676 0.265596 0.140003 0.075662 0.112311 0.075276 
Prob (F-
statistic) 
0.030606 0.025323 0.018384 0.104449 0.215552 0.144617  0.21642 
DW  2.004717 1.947895 1.936576 2.108148 2.161545 2.244013 2.162722 
Notes: Dependent variable: ∆ Fiscal balance: Central gov’t. In square brackets, p-values based on heteroscedastic-consistent 
(White-robust) standard errors are reported. Asterisks indicate variables that are significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% 
(***) levels. Total number of observations is 33. DW = Durbin-Watson test statistic. The model specification was based on 
the specification presented in Thornton and Mati (2008).  
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Table 4: Physical capital investment regressions for Australia, 1972-2005 




-0.121954   
[0.3998] 




- -0.184909     
[0.2864] 




-  -  -0.231164   
[0.1389] 





- - -  0.104177     
[0.0565]* 
- - - 
Tax autonomy: 
Central total  
 


















-0.055513   
[0.8042] 
0.03173   
[0.8797] 
-0.078633   
[0.7149] 
0.104219   
[0.6245] 
-0.146324   
[0.4820] 
-0.148396   
[0.4848] 





0.00000302   
[0.9611] 
-0.000121   
[0.1251] 
-0.0000096   
[0.8351] 
-
0.0000132   
[0.7772] 
-0.0000927   
[0.0335]** 
-0.00012   
[0.0089]*** 





-0.119428   
[0.1615] 
0.065633   
[0.6583] 
-0.115984   
[0.0438]** 
-0.071508   
[0.0699]* 
0.005462   
[0.8534] 
0.016019   
[0.6406] 





-0.147109   
[0.2553] 
-0.13282   
[0.1680] 
-0.147029   
[0.2166] 
-0.111711   
[0.3040] 
-0.229978   
[0.0262]** 
-0.227179   
[0.0284]** 




0.670978   
[0.0068]*** 
0.662761   
[0.0019]*** 
0.641813   
[0.0087]*** 
0.57175   
[0.0159]** 
0.736004   
[0.0014]*** 
0.902198   
[0.0004]*** 
0.760275   
[0.0011]*** 
Adj-R
2  0.549976 0.57193 0.572057  0.589021  0.664348  0.649836  0.640347 
Prob (F-
statistic) 
0.000096 0.000053 0.000052  0.000032  0.000003 0.000005 0.000006 
Notes: Dependent variable: Investment. In square brackets, p -values  based on heteroscedastic-consistent (White-robust) 
standard errors are reported. Asterisks indicate variables that are significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels. Total 
number of observations is 33. Estimation of the base model by OLS highlighted a problem of serial correlation, as was 
evidenced by an analysis of the autocorrelation function and Ljung-Box Q-statistics. To account for this, both one and two 
lags of the dependent variable were included alternatively in the model. Redundant variable tests on the lags, Ramsey RESET 
tests and Breusch-Godfrey LM tests confirmed both were adequate models. So, in the interests of parsimony and taking into 
account the limited degrees of freedom available in this model, only one lag of the dependent variable was ultimately 
included. One should note that estimation with two lags of the dependent variable produced similar results.  43 
 
Table 5: Economic growth (short-term) regressions for Australia, 1972-2005 




11.08439   
[0.6018] 




-  3.830167   
[0.4128] 




- -  -7.943197     
[0.0536]* 




-  -  -  8.181169   
[0.3541] 








Central total  
 











37.50276   
[0.2075] 
42.82733   
[0.2305] 
31.76853   
[0.2800] 
42.18351   
[0.1804] 
36.74928   
[0.2541] 
39.36356   
[0.2184] 





44.65482   
[0.0411]** 
41.8847   
[0.0562]* 
14.23809   
[0.5386] 
44.15346   
[0.0345]** 
42.21736   
[0.0579]* 
39.72528   
[0.0688]* 





0.468789   
[0.9430] 
-0.786851   
[0.8775] 
-4.280361   
[0.3995] 
0.002391   
[0.9997] 
-1.54687   
[0.7630] 
-0.238392   
[0.9666] 





0.109852   
[0.6741] 
-0.007672   
[0.9847] 
0.382304   
[0.2611] 
0.00041   
[0.9989] 
0.12458   
[0.7028] 
0.071189   
[0.8489] 





-0.011437   
[0.6966] 
-0.024809   
[0.3614] 
0.010127   
[0.6934] 
-0.020992   
[0.3335] 
-0.020124   
[0.4304] 
-0.018269   
[0.4182] 





0.170994   
[0.4970] 
0.179803   
[0.3970] 
-0.005837   
[0.9782] 
0.187725   
[0.4086] 
0.135668   
[0.5331] 
0.13163   
[0.5466] 




-21.85999   
[0.3233] 
-22.93536   
[0.2000] 
-28.99455   
[0.1026] 
-21.88102   
[0.2548] 
-24.57954   
[0.1932] 
-24.22508   
[0.2038] 
-24.05981   
[0.1979] 
Adj-R
2  0.247935 0.24724 0.330372  0.250017  0.240599  0.241227  0.241579 
Prob  (F-statistic) 0.058603 0.05906 0.021237  0.057248 0.06358 0.063141  0.062896 
DW  1.903593 1.917129 1.829221 1.917847 1.904442 1.910237 1.907253 
Notes: Dependent variable: Growth (year-by-year). In square brackets, p-values based on heteroscedastic-consistent (White-
robust) standard errors are reported. Asterisks indicate variables that are significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) 
levels. Total number of observations is 33. See in text for details of model specification.  44 
 
Table 6: Economic growth (medium-term) regressions for Australia, 1972-2005 




-6.950745   
[0.0103]** 




- 11.47916     
[0.0075]*** 




-  -  5.109315   
[0.0160]** 




-  -  -  -2.081654   
[0.0193]** 


























-95.51434   
[0.0000]*** 
-93.50613   
[0.0000]*** 




-86.02179   
[0.0000]*** 
-89.72158   
[0.0000]*** 





-2.789772   
[0.1526] 
-4.135154   
[0.0717]* 
-4.400773   
[0.0325]** 
-2.065937   
[0.3295] 
-4.875391   
[0.0299]** 
-4.868313   
[0.0235]** 













0.641263   
[0.0001]*** 















0.070558   
[0.0000]*** 







-0.076962   
[0.3614] 
0.024127   
[0.7312] 
-0.018743   
[0.7610] 
-0.059149   
[0.4911] 
-0.011812   
[0.8693] 
-0.020395   
[0.7656] 










10.95051   
[0.0038]*** 
15.85775   
[0.0001]*** 





2  0.873686 0.857699 0.877158 0.861619 0.848284 0.859889 0.856528 
Prob (F-
statistic) 
0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
DW  1.691881  1.52743  1.749668 1.567353 1.532854 1.619691 1.645366 
Notes: Dependent variable: Growth (3-year MA). In square brackets, p-values based on heteroscedastic-consistent (White-
robust) standard errors are reported. Asterisks indicate variables that are significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) 
levels. Total number of observations is 31. See in text for details of model specification. 45 
 
 
Table 7: Bayesian model averaging: Explanatory variables for Australia, 1972-2005 
Explanatory Variable  Posterior 
Probability of 




Consumption 0.9042  -1.0609  0.5871  1.8070 
Unemployment 0.6205  0.4696  0.4090  1.1480 
Human capital  0.5885  0.0229  0.0214  1.0701 
Population growth   0.4496  -0.9734  1.2457  0.7525 
Gov’t consumption   0.3790  0.6772  0.9885  0.6851 
Savings   0.1833  0.0582  0.5008  0.1162 
Tax revenue   0.1295  0.0354  0.1210  0.2926 
Trade 0.0950  0.0148  0.0763  0.1940 
Openness 0.0757  -0.0188  0.1250  0.1504 
Investment 0.0650  0.0127  0.0888  0.1430 
Inflation 0.0491  0.0012  0.0265  0.0453 
GDP Deflator   0.0483  0.0023  0.0282  0.0816 
Notes: Variables above the dotted line are considered effective under Fernandez et al. (2001a) threshold and 




Table 8: Bayesian model averaging: Decentralisation measures for Australia, 1972-2005 
Decentralisation Measure  Posterior 
Probability of 
Inclusion 
Posterior Mean  Posterior 
Standard 
Deviation 
|Mean| / SD 
Tax autonomy: Sub-Central 
total 
0.3451 -0.1869  0.3219  0.5806 
Tax autonomy: Central total  0.2897  0.6428  1.2672  0.5072 
Revenue share: Total  0.1671  0.0803  0.2436  0.3260 
Tax share: Central total  0.1643  0.2637  1.8896  0.1396 
Revenue share: Local  0.1062  0.1293  0.4962  0.2601 
Non-Tax share: Sub-central 
total 
0.0964 -0.014  0.0609  0.2299 
Revenue share: State  0.0956  0.0249  0.1366  0.1823 
Tax share: Sub-central total  0.0853  -0.0127  0.1131  0.1123 
Average share  0.0824  0.0241  0.1523  0.1582 
Revenue decentralisation  0.0747  -0.0064  0.1259  0.0508 
Expenditure share: Local  0.0735  -0.1105  1.9892  0.0555 
Expenditure share: State  0.0655  -0.0938  2.0009  0.0469 
Expenditure centralisation  0.0643  -0.0044  0.0576  0.0764 
Expenditure share: Total  0.0626  0.0839  1.9989  0.0420 
Transfer share  0.0537  -0.0027  0.0304  0.0888 
Vertical Imbalance  0.0498  0.0011  0.0237  0.0464 
Notes: Variables above the dotted line are considered effective under Fernandez et al. (2001a) threshold and no 





Table 9: Income distribution regressions for the states of Australia, 2000-2005 
Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
















-  -  -  0.036576    
[0.0181]** 





-0.0000029   
[0.0627]* 
-0.0000056  
  [0.1035] 



















-0.004821   
[0.0259]** 
-0.005676   
[0.0114]** 



















- - - 
Adj-R
2  0.539784 0.751926 0.805336 0.972036 
Prob  (F-statistic)  0.460109 0.081137 0.057227 0.003256 
Notes: Dependent variable: Inequity. In square brackets, p-values based on heteroscedastic-consistent (White-robust) standard 
errors are reported. Asterisks indicate variables that are significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels. Total number 
of observations is 8. Regression (1) presents the estimates when all 5 potential variables suggested by economic theory are 
included. Due to the limited degrees of freedom available with a cross-section of 8 States, the number of explanatory variables 
had to be reduced. Thus, regressions (2), (3), and (4) dropped those variables with the least statistical significance. The results 




Table 10: State economic growth cross-sectional regressions for Australia, 2000-2005 
Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
State tax share: Local 
 
 
-  0.147234   
[0.5019] 
- - - - 
State tax share: State 
 
 
- -0.649151     
[0.1673] 
- - - - 
State tax share: 
Central total 
 
-  -  -0.840258   
[0.0178]** 
- - - 





















-0.066812   
[0.0331]** 
0.472069   
[0.3828] 
0.817581   
[0.0184]** 
-0.102558   
[0.5503] 
-0.220102   
[0.3746] 





-0.056398   
[0.0031]*** 
-0.089313   
[0.1512] 
-0.096799   
[0.0033]*** 
0.066051   
[0.8001] 
-0.054401   
[0.1128] 






-0.926986   
[0.0401]** 
-0.168499   
[0.9459] 
-1.843302   
[0.0222]** 
6.880552   
[0.6451] 
-0.776693   
[0.5186] 
-0.300488   
[0.4794] 
Gov’t consumption  -0.045801   
[0.1303] 
-0.318372   
[0.4425] 
-0.128645   
[0.0339]** 
-1.580691   
[0.6290] 
-0.055781   
[0.7639] 
-0.186937   
[0.1729] 
Adj-R
2  0.973097 0.990322 0.977473 0.698936 0.759181 0.883473 
Prob  (F-statistic)  0.019106 0.069653 0.016013 0.201373  0.16324  0.081167 
Notes: Dependent variable: State growth. In square brackets, p -values  based on heteroscedastic-consistent (White-robust) 
standard errors are reported. Asterisks indicate variables that are significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels. Total 
number of observations is 8. The model specification was based on the specification presented by Xie et al. (1999). Due to the 
very limited degrees of freedom not all potential explanatory variables were included in the model. Accordingly, redundant 
variable tests were performed on regressors with particularly low t-statistics: trade, human capital and mining revenue. Tests 
on these variables did not reject the null hypothesis of insignificance and were consequently deleted from the model. A 





Table 11: State economic growth panel regressions for Australia, 1990-2005 
Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 





- - - - 
State tax share: State 
 
 
-  0.009287   
[0.7094] 
- - - - 
State tax share: 
Central total 
 
-  -  -0.029698   
[0.0794]* 
- - - 
State tax share: Local 
sub-central total 
 
































-0.006958   
[0.0501]* 
-0.002316   
[0.4968] 
-0.006772   
[0.0545]* 
-0.006806   
[0.0531]* 
-0.007062   
[0.0481]** 





-0.09158   
[0.0041]*** 
-0.077287   
[0.0089]*** 
-0.088383   
[0.0052]*** 
-0.090522   
[0.0042]*** 
-0.093139   
[0.0038]*** 































-0.010852   
[0.0854]* 
-0.009254   
[0.1147] 
-0.010292   
[0.1001] 
-0.009104   
[0.1494] 
-0.010811   
[0.0877]* 








0.425055   
[0.0005]*** 
0.430682   
[0.0004]*** 
0.455389   
[0.0006]*** 
0.436469   
[0.0004]*** 
Adj-R
2  0.986988 0.988914 0.987213 0.987227 0.986899 0.987134 
Prob  (F-statistic)  0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
Notes: Dependent variable: State growth. In square brackets, p -values  are reported. Asterisks indicate variables that are 
significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels. Total number of observations is 136. The model specification was 
based on the specification presented by Xie et al. (1999). See in text for further details of model specification. 
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Table 12: Summary of Results: Australia as a Whole  
Notes: “not sig” indicates the variable is not statistically significant, “+” indicates a statistically significant positive 
relationship and “-” indicates a statistically significant negative relationship. 
 
Table 13: Summary of Results: State Level 






State tax share: Local   not  sig - 
State tax share: State   not  sig  not  sig 
State tax share: Central total    - - 
State tax share: Local sub-central 
total 
not sig  not sig  - 
State expenditure share: Total   not  sig  not  sig 
State expenditure share: State  not sig     
State investment share: Total  +  not sig  not sig 
Notes: “not sig” indicates the variable is not statistically significant, “+” indicates a statistically significant positive 
relationship and “-” indicates a statistically significant negative relationship.



















Expenditure share: Total  not sig  + -  not sig  not sig  - 
Revenue share: Total  -  not sig  +  not sig  not sig  + 
Tax share: Central total  -  not sig  not sig  not sig  not sig  not sig 
Tax autonomy: Sub-central 
total 
- +  not sig  -  not sig  not sig 
Tax autonomy: Central total -  +  not sig  -  not sig  + 
Revenue decentralisation  - +  not sig  -  not sig  + 
Average share    not sig  +   not  sig  - 
Transfer share    +      not sig  not sig 
Vertical Imbalance        +  not sig  not sig 
Tax share: Sub-Central total          -  not sig 
Non-Tax share: Sub-Central 
total 
       not  sig  + 
Expenditure centralisation          not sig  not sig 
Expenditure share: State          not sig  not sig 
Expenditure share: Local         not  sig  +   
Revenue share: State          not sig  not sig 
Revenue share: Local          not sig  not sig   51 
 
 
Figure 1: State shares of fiscal resources, 2000-2005 
 
Source:  ABS Australian National Accounts: State Accounts Cat 5220.0, author’s calculations. 
 
Notes: States with a share greater than one have a relatively larger share of fiscal resources than those States with a 
share less than one. Furthermore, as the absolute difference from one increases the level of State income 












Expenditure share: Total: Total sub-central government (SCG) expenditure to total consolidated general 
government (GG) expenditure, net of transfers from sub-central governments to the central government. 
Expenditure share: State: Total state government expenditure to total consolidated general government (GG) 
expenditure. 
Expenditure share: Local: Total local government expenditure to total consolidated general government (GG) 
expenditure. 
Revenue share: total: Total sub-central government (SCG) revenue to total consolidated general government 
(GG) Revenue, net of transfers from sub-central governments to the central government. 
Revenue share: State: Total state government revenue to total consolidated general government (GG) Revenue. 
Revenue share: Local: Total local government revenue to total consolidated general government (GG) revenue. 
Tax share: Central total: Total sub-central government (SCG) taxation revenue to total general government 
(GG) taxation revenue. 
Tax share: Sub-central total: Total sub-central government (SCG) taxation revenue to total sub-central 
government (SCG) revenue and transfers.   
Non-Tax share: Sub-central total: Total sub-central government (SCG) non-taxation revenue to total sub-
central government (SCG) revenue and transfers.   
Average share: Average of Expenditure share: Total and Revenue share: Total. 
Vertical imbalance: Total sub-central governments’ indebtedness to the central government to total sub-central 
government expenditure. 
Transfer share: Total sub-central governments’ share of transfers to in sub-central government total revenue and 
transfers.  
 
Source: World Development Indicators, IMF Government Finance Statistics, author’s calculations. 
 
 
Corrected Measures:  
Revenue decentralisation: Total sub-central governments (SCG) taxation revenue derived from sources where 
sub-central governments have at least minimum control according to OECD (2005) classification to total 
general government taxation revenue. Minimum control is defined as sources where (a) SCG sets tax rate 
and tax base; (b) SCG sets tax rate only (c) SCG sets tax base.  
Tax autonomy: Central total: Total sub-central governments (SCG) taxation revenue derived from sources 
where sub-central governments have at least minimum control according to OECD (2005) classification to 
total general government taxation revenue. Minimum control is defined as sources where (a) SCG sets tax 
rate and tax base; (b) SCG sets tax rate only (c) SCG sets tax base. 
Tax autonomy: Sub-central total: Total sub-central governments (SCG) taxation revenue derived from sources 
where sub-central governments have at least minimum control according to OECD (2005) classification to 
total sub-central governments taxation revenue. Minimum control is defined as sources where (a) SCG sets 
tax rate and tax base; (b) SCG sets tax rate only (c) SCG sets tax base. 
Expenditure centralisation: Total central government consumption expenditure to total consolidated general 
government (GG) consumption expenditure. 
 




State expenditure share: Total: Total sub-central government (SCG) expenditure to total consolidated general 
government (GG) expenditure. 
State expenditure share: State: Total state government expenditure to total consolidated general government 
(GG) expenditure.  
State tax share: Local: Total local government taxation revenue to total general government tax revenue.  
  State tax share: State: Total state government taxation revenue to total general government tax revenue.   
State tax share: Central total: Total sub-central government (SCG) taxation revenue to total general 
government tax revenue.   
State tax share: Local sub-central total: Total local taxation revenue to total sub-central government (SCG) 
revenue.   
State investment share: Total sub-central governments’ investment to general government investment.   
 
Source:  ABS Australian National Accounts: State Accounts Cat 5220.0, author’s calculations. 54 
 
Table A1: Data definitions of variables 
Variable  Definition 
Aggregate Variables 
Growth  GDP per capita growth. Source: World Development Indicators Units: annual % 
Inflation Consumer  Price  Index.  Source: World Development Indicators. Units: annual % change 
Misery index  Misery Index = Unemployment + Inflation. Source: World Development Indicators and 
Australian Bureau of Statistics Labour Force, Australia Cat 6202.0. Units: percent points 
Gov’t expenditure  Government Expenditure. Source: World Development Indicators. Units: % GDP 
∆ Fiscal balance: 
Central gov’t 
Annual change in central government fiscal balance. Source: IMF Government Finance 
Statistics. Units: % GDP 
Investment  Gross fixed capital formation. The acquisition, less disposal, of fixed assets. Source: World 
Development Indicators. Units: % GDP  
GDP per capita  Gross Domestic Product per capita. Source: World Development Indicators. Units: $  




Disposable Income per capita. Source: ABS Household Income and Income, Statistics 
Distribution Cat 6523.0. Units: $ 
Money  Money and quasi money (M2). Source: World Development Indicators. Units: % GDP 
Tax revenue (WDI)   Taxation Revenue. Source: World Development Indicators. Units: % GDP  
Tax revenue (IMF)  Taxation Revenue. Source: IMF Government Finance Statistics. Units: % GDP 
Trade  Average of exports and imports. Source: World Development Indicators. Units: % GDP  
Fiscal balance  Fiscal balance. Source: ABS Yearbook Australia Cat 1301.0. Units: % GDP  
∆ Fiscal Balance:  
sub-Central gov’t 
Annual Change in Subcentral Government Fiscal Balance. Source: IMF Government 
Finance Statistics. Units: % GDP 
Gov’t consumption  Government Consumption Expenditure. Source: World Development Indicators. Units: % 
GDP 
Transfers Transfers  Share.  Source: IMF Government Finance Statistics. Units: % Sub-central 
government total revenue and grants 
Consumption  Final Consumption Expenditure. Source: World Development Indicators. Units: % GDP 
Savings Gross  Domestic  Savings.  Source: World Development Indicators. Units: % GDP 
Population Population.  Source: ABS Australian Economic Indicators Cat 1350. Units: in millions 
Debt  Level of public debt. Source: ABS Australian Economic Indicators Cat 1350.0 Units: % 
GDP 
GDP deflator  GDP Deflator. Source: World Development Indicators. Units: Annual % 
Population growth  Population growth. Source: ABS Australian Economic Indicators Cat. no.1350.0. Units: 
annual %  
Human capital  Secondary School Enrolment. Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. Units: % Gross 
Unemployment   Unemployment. Source:  ABS Labour Force, Australia Cat. no.  6202.0. Units: % Labour 
Force 
Openness Total  exports.  Source: World Development Indicators. Units: % GDP 
   
State Variables  
Inequity Defined  in-text.  Source:  ABS Australian National Accounts: State Accounts Cat 5220.0.  
State growth  GSP per capita growth. Source:  ABS Australian National Accounts: State Accounts Cat 
5220.0. Units: annual % 
GSP per capita
  Initial gross state product per capita. Source:  ABS Australian National Accounts: State 
Accounts Cat 5220.0. Units: $ 
Inflation Consumer  Price  Index.  Source:  ABS CPI, Australia Cat 6401.0. Units: Annual % 
Aboriginal 
Population 
Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for for States that have a relatively large Aboriginal 
population (Queensland, Western Australia and the Northern Territory), 0 otherwise.  
Unemployment   Unemployment. Source:  ABS Labour Force, Australia Cat. no.6202.0. Units: % Labour 
Force 
Population Population.  Source: ABS Australian Demographic Statistics Cat no. 3101.0. Units: in 55 
 
millions 
Gov’t consumption  Government Consumption Expenditure. Source: ABS Australian National Accounts: State 
Accounts, Cat. no. 5220.0. Units: % GSP  
Consumption Household  Consumption  Expenditure.  Source: ABS Australian National Accounts: State 
Accounts, Cat. no. 5220.0. Units: % GSP 
Investment  Gross Fixed Capital Formation. Source: ABS Australian National Accounts: State 
Accounts, Cat. no. 5220.0. Units: % GSP  
Inflation: Capital 
cities 
Consumer price index of capital cities (Index Numbers). Source: ABS Consumer Price 
Index, Australia Cat. no. 6401. Units: percent units 




Education Expenditure. Source: Commonwealth Grants Commission,  Relative Fiscal 
Capacities of the States. Units: % GSP 
Mining revenue  Mining Revenue. Source: Commonwealth Grants Commission, Relative Fiscal Capacities 
of the States. Units: % GSP 
Notes: ∆ denotes change. Variables expressed as a percentage of GDP or GSP were transformed into natural 
logarithms, as were those expressed in levels.   56 
 
Table A2: Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Standard  Deviation 
Aggregate Variables   
Growth 1.803 1.769 
Inflation 6.386 4.171 
Misery index  13.314 3.662 
Gov’t expenditure 19.146 1.306 
∆ Fiscal balance: Central gov’t -0.064 0.974 
Investment 25.291 1.917 
GDP per capita 21,692.97 12,692.45 
GDP 21,692.97 12,692.45 
Disposable income  20,929.67 12,107.86 
Money 51.825 13.061 
Tax revenue (WDI)    17.735 4.551 
Tax revenue (IMF) 28.928 5.783 
Trade 32.699 6.503 
Fiscal balance  -0.699 1.588 
∆ Fiscal Balance: sub-Central gov’t -0.068 0.524 
Gov’t consumption 18.096 1.052 
Transfers 47.327 4.463 
Consumption 18.096 1.052 
Savings 25.925 4.867 
Population 16,901,451 2,181,366 
Debt 0.400 0.130 
GDP deflator  6.271 4.440 
Population growth 1.340 0.300 
Human capital 107.624 33.377 
Unemployment   6.928 2.105 





Bayesian Model Averaging in the Normal Linear Regression Model  
The normal linear regression model is written as  
Nr r =+ + y ι X βε α       ( A . 1 )  
where N is the number of time periods and K is the number of regressors: ￿ is an intercept,  N ι  
is a  1 N ×  vector of ones, X is a NK ×  matrix stacking all the potential explanatory 
variables, r X is a  r Nk ×  matrix containing some (or all) columns of X and the N-vector of 
errors ￿ is assumed to be 
1 (0 , ) NT Nh I
− . The data is for i = 1, …, N individuals and the 
observations are stacked in an N-vector  1 ( ,..., )' T y y = y .   
There are r = 1, …, R models, denoted by Mr and since there are 2
K possible subsets of X, 
2
K R = . Each model depends on a vector of parameters  r θ and is represented by a 
prior (| ) rr p θ M , likelihood  (|, ) rr p y θ M  and posterior (| , ) rr p θ yM . From here the 
posterior model probabilities  (| ) r p My can be obtained. 
The Normal Linear Regression likelihood function for each model can be written in terms 
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 vNk =−            ( A . 3 )  
1 ˆ (') '
− = β XX Xy           ( A . 4 )  





yX β yX β
         ( A . 5 )    
The choice of prior under model uncertainty can have a significant influence on posterior 
model probabilities.
26 To control this problem, Fernandez et al. (2001a) propose a benchmark 
prior distribution that they show to have very little impact on posterior results. This involves 
                                                  
26 See George (1999) and Kass and Raftery (1995) for more detail.  58 
 
using a Normal-Gamma natural conjugate prior with the following hyperparameters: an 
improper non-informative prior for parameters common to all models, specifically ￿ and h, 




∝                       (A.6) 
() 1 p ∝ α                                 (A.7) 
Assuming a common prior for h is customary in the Bayesian literature since h keeps a 
constant meaning (residual standard deviation of ygiven Z) across models when conditioning 
across the full set of regressors.
27 Also, to ensure the non-informative prior for the intercept 
has the same interpretation for each model, namely the mean of y, Fernandez et al. (2001b) 
suggest subtracting the means off all explanatory variables. 
The Normal-Gamma natural conjugate prior was used as analytical results exist for 
posterior moments and posterior model probabilities.  This implies that the prior for ￿r can be 
written as 
1 |( ,) r r r hN h
− ββ V         ( A . 8 )  
where the priors of explanatory variables are hypothesised to have no effect on the dependent 
variable. Finally, a g-prior is used as the benchmark prior for  r V  as it only necessitates 
finding the scalar hyperparameter gr.
28 Thus, the conditional probability of the explanatory 
variables is presented as: 
()
1 1' |0 ,
r r k rrr hN h g
− − ⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦ β XX        ( A . 9 )  
The posterior, derived by multiplying the prior by the likelihood function, follows a 
multivariate t distribution with mean and covariance matrix: 
' (| , ) r rr r r E ≡= β yM β VXy     ( A . 1 0 )  
2








β yM V      ( A . 1 1 )  
                                                  
27 See for example Raftery et al. (1997)). 
28 For a more detailed explanation of the g-prior and its properties see Zellner (1986). 59 
 
where vN =  degrees of freedom and 
()
1 ' 1 r rr r g
−
=+ ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ VX X       ( A . 1 2 )  
2
1














X yP y y y ι yy ι
      ( A . 1 3 )  
with 
'1 ' ()
r Nr r rr
− =− X PIX X X X          ( A . 1 4 )  
The marginal likelihood for model r, using the g-prior, is: 
1
2 2 1














∝+ − − ⎜⎟ ⎢⎥ ++ + ⎝⎠ ⎣ ⎦
X yM y ' Py y y ι yy ι  (A.15) 
To calculate the posterior model probabilities the following formula is used: 
(| ) ( |) () rr r pc p p = My y M M      ( A . 1 6 )  
where  c is a constant. Prior model probabilities are assumed to be equal. This allows 



















       ( A . 1 7 )  
Finally, Fernandez et al. (2001b) suggest that the optimal values for the g-prior should be 
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− ==.  Furthermore, since
2 NK < , equation the g-prior is specified 
as
2 1/ r gK = .  
Analytical computations of the equations presented above are possible. However, due to 60 
 
the large number of potential regressors involved this is not feasible as there are a very large 
number of terms involved in the sums. Thus, the Markov Chain Monte Carlo Model 
Composition (MC
3) methodology of Madigan and York (1995) is used. This algorithm takes 
draws from the parameter space in such a way that it replicates draws from the posterior by 
taking most draws from parameter spaces where posterior probability is high. 
The MC
3 algorithm adopted is based on the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm where 
candidate models are drawn from a particular distribution over the model space and then 
accepted with a specified probability. If the candidate model fails to be accepted, the chain of 
models remains at the current model (
() ( 1 ) SS − = MM , where 
() S M is the model drawn at 
replication S). Then the next candidate model is drawn from the set of models including the 
current model, all models which delete one explanatory variable from the current model and 
all models which add one explanatory variable to the current model.  The probability of 
acceptance is calculated as: 
(1 )
(1 ) (1 )
(| * )( * )














α      (A.19) 
The models generated by the MC
3 algorithm are then averaged over the number of draws to 
calculate the posterior results.  To analyse the data, the Bayesian framework above is 
employed with a Uniform prior on model probabilities: () 2
k
rr pp
− == M . Furthermore, 
since
2 NK < , equation (A.18) specifies the g-prior as
2 1/ r gK = . The results reported are 
from 1 million recorded draws after 500 000 burn-in replications to account for the starting 
value of the chain. Results for 500 000 replications with 100 000 burn-in draws produced 
similar conclusions. This indicates that increasing the draws from 1 million will not 
significantly alter the results. Thus, 1 million draws is sufficient for this analysis. 
 